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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/dJt 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
Califomia limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California corporation; 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, individually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants-Res ondents. 
Docket No. 37869 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING - 1 
COME NOW the above-named Appellants, by and through their counsel of 
record, Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, pursuant to Rule 42 of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and submit this Brief in support of their Petition for Rehearing 
related to matters in this Court's decision filed April 26, 2012, affinning the Decision and 
Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District for the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Bonneville, entered May 28,2010. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Petition for Rehearing, Appellants respectfully request that the Court 
rehear this case for the following reasons: 
1. In its analysis of fraud, could the jury reasonably find statements in the 
Estoppel Certificate regarding the payment of rent to be true, while totally disregarding a 
contrary jury instruction? 
2. Should this Court have addressed Appellants' arguments regarding fraud 
by nondisclosure? 
3. Couldn't the Appellants seek contractual, legal or equitable remedies 
after signing the Purchase and Sale Agreement if they subsequently learned that High 
Mark breached the Agreement by providing false infonnation? 
4. In view of evidence showing the Appellants did not know the tenant was 
not paying rent, was it reasonable to conclude that the Appellants would nonetheless have 
purchased the property had they known the tenant was not paying rent? 
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5. Was it procedurally proper for the trial court to analyze Appellant's 
Motion for New Trial by failing to consider any of the facts presented by the Appellant at 
trial? 
ARGUMENT 
1. The jury could not have reasonably concluded that statements in the 
Income and Expense Statement and Estoppel Certificate regarding the payment of rent 
"were truthfuL" 
In this Court's April 26, 2012 Opinion in O'Shea v. High Mark 
Development, on the issue of fraud, the Court concluded that "the jury could have found 
that the Center did not fail to pay six month's rent. It borrowed money from Gordon 
Arave and Jared Arave to pay that rent." O'Shea, 2012 Opinion No. 67, slip op. at 7. 
"Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could have concluded 
that the statements in the Income and Expense Statement and the Estoppel Certificate 
were truthfuL" Id. 
follows: 
However, the trial court instructed the jury, in Instruction No. 31, as 
The Court also previously found that the Lease Estoppel 
Certificate did not contain accurate infonnation, that is, 
representations that the Lease had not been modified, 
supplemented, altered or amended, and representations that 
all minimum monthly rent had been paid, were not accurate [ .] 
R., p. 1329M. This Court did not consider the language in Instruction No. 31 significant 
in its analysis of fraud, explaining that the trial court "did not include a similar instruction 
when instructing the jury on fraud." O'Shea, p. 8, n.2. 
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The Court's decision in that respect is contrary to its own precedent 
regarding jury instructions. "It is axiomatic and fundamental that the jury must take the 
law from the instructions given[.]" McNichols v. Simplot Co., 74 Idaho 321,327,262 
P.2d 1012 (1953). "[T]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction is not 
erroneous where the substance of the proposed instruction is covered elsewhere in the 
instructions given." Boll v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 334, 339-40, 92 
P.3d 1081 (2004); see also Quincy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 41, Benewah County, 102 
Idaho 756, 769, 640 P .2d 304 (1981) (holding that the trial court did not err when it 
"found it was unnecessary to instruct the jury again on the undisputed facts."). Jury 
instructions are to be reviewed "as a whole" to determine whether they fairly and 
adequately present the issues and state the law. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 185, 
219 P.3d 1192 (2009). 
The language in Instruction 31 that the "representations that all minimum 
monthly rent had been paid, were not accurate" was the law of the case. It was not 
necessary for the same language to appear in a fraud instruction, as it was "covered 
elsewhere in the instructions given" and the instructions were to be viewed "as a whole." 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on that point, stating that the jury "must 
consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others." R., p. 1329B 
(Instruction No.2). 
The jury had to conclude that the statements in the Estoppel Certificate 
regarding the payment of rent were "not accurate." It could not reasonably have come to 
two inconsistent factual conclusions regarding the truthfulness of the Estoppel 
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Certificate. In other words, the same Janguage in the Estoppel Certificate that was 
inaccurate in the breach of contract context could not reasonably have been considered to 
be accurate in the fraud context. It could not be both "true" and "untrue" that all 
minimum monthly rent had been paid. 
Furthermore, the inaccurate message that all monthJy rent had been paid 
was also conveyed by the Income and Expense Statement. .s§~ Exh. 20 (stating, under 
the title "Idaho Falls Childrens Center", that "Rent Received from 612006 through 
7/2001" was $324,836 .. 00.). This message was false in any context, regardless of where 
in the instructions the statement regarding its falsity existed. The Estoppel Certificate 
and Income and Expense Statement both contained information that led Appellants to 
believe that the property was income-producing as advertised, when, in fact, the tenant's 
obligation to pay several months' rent had simply been "released." Exh. )3,.,. 
FinaHy, this Court commented in its Opinion that the trial court's finding of 
breach of contract was not based upon the same evidence presented at trial. Q~Shea, p. 
16. This, however, does not change the fact that the jury was instructed that (a) the 
Estoppel Certificate contained false infonnation, and (b) such information constituted a 
breach of contract. The jury was not entitled to disregard such an instmction even with 
new evidence. 
Appellants respectfulJy request that this Court rehear argument concerning 
the fraud, nondisclosure, and breach of contract issues, as all are affected by this analysis. 
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2. Appellants did raise the issues of nondisclosure and inadequacy of 
the jury instruction on that subject sufficient for the Court to review both on appeal. 
In its Opinion the Court refused to address fraud by nondisclosure, 
declaring that the Appellants had not argued it on appeal. The Court also refused to 
consider error injury instruction No. 34 for the same reason. The Court stated, "[w]e 
will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by argument and 
propositions of law." O'Shea, pp. 4, 15,20 (quoting Ingma v. Boise County ex reI. Bd. 
OfComm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450 (2003)). 
The requirement in Lnama is set forth in the Appellate Rules, LA.R. 
35(a)(6), which provides as follows: 
(6) Argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations and 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon. 
Rule 35(a)(6) does not require arguments be divided into separate sections, and does not 
limit the Court from considering arguments in support of the issues presented on appeal 
wherever they appear within the brief. Appellants respectfully assert that they argued 
issues of nondisclosure throughout their Brief, and argued the factual bases for the jury 
instruction argument, complying in each instance with the requirements of the Rule. 
a. Nondisclosure. 
Appellants identified what infonnation was not disclosed, including the 
"Center's failure to pay rent from September 2006 through February 2007, the Center's 
signing of a promissory note for the unpaid rent, the failure to pay rent for October and 
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November 2007, and the November 7,2007 promissory note for unpaid rentr.]" 
Appellants' Brief, p. 16. The trial court held, however, that the jury could have 
concluded the undisclosed information "was not so vital, material and unknown that it 
should have been timely disclosed." Id. (citing R., p. 1418-21). 
In their Argument, Appellants strenuously disagreed with the trial court's 
detennination that the undisclosed information was not "material" or "unknown": 
Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict on the 
fraud claims, whether analyzed subjectively or objectively. 
Subjectively, each Appellant's trial testimony was that they 
would not have decided to purchase the property if they had 
known about the nonpayment of rent. Furthermore, based 
upon the language of the Estoppel Certificate, Respondents 
knew or had reason to know that the Appellants believed rent 
payment . . . [was] important in determining whether to 
purchase the property .... 
Objectively, there was no evidence presented at trial 
that the nonpayment of rent by a tenant would not be 
important to a purchaser of a property expecting a good-
paying tenant. The District Court did not analyze, 
su~jectively, whether the Respondents should have believed 
that nonpayment of rent would have been important to the 
Appellants, or objectively, where this information would be 
impOliant to any reasonable person .... 
Appellants' Brief, p. 25. 
The undisclosed infonnation was certainly unknown, however "with 
respect to the allegations of ... fraud by nondisclosure, the trial court's failure to look at 
the evidence again affected its decision. The elements of materiality, knowledge of 
falsity, justifiable reliance, and resultant injury are all connected to whether or not the 
infonnation made available to the Appellants actually disclosed the inaccuracy of the 
misrepresentations." Id., p. 23. 
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Citing Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998) and Sowards v. 
Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000), the Appellants argued that the Respondents 
had a duty to disclose certain documents, due to Respondents' representations that the 
tenant was paying its monthly rent: 
Under Watts and Sowards, High Mark had an 
affinnative duty to disclose the evidence of promissory notes 
which materially altered the rent payment responsibilities of 
the Center, as stated in the Lease Agreement. These included 
not only the April 18, 2007 promissory note, but also the 
November 7, 2007 promissory note, signed after the Estoppel 
Certificate had been provided to Appellants. This 
'subsequent information' made High Mark's previous 
representation 'untrue or misleading.' High Mark also had a 
duty to disclose that 'all minimum monthly rent' had in fact 
not been paid, in order 'to prevent a partial or ambiguous 
statement of fact from becoming misleading.' As previously 
stated, this 'information ... [was] not already in possession of 
the other patiY." 
Appellants' Brief, p. 34. 
In its Opinion, this Court found that the Estoppel Celiificate and Income 
and Expense Statement did not "purport to represent whether the Center had paid rent in 
October November, or December 2007." O'Shea, p. 13. However, this does not consider 
the context in which these documents were sent to the Appellants, together with the 
context of the nondisclosures. Context is critical to a determination of whether a 
nondisclosure is in fact misleading. 
The critical message of the Estoppel Certificate and the Income and 
Expense Statement to the Appellants was, simply, that the "property being sold and 
purchased as an income-producing propeliy was actually producing the income 
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represented." O'Shea, p. 32 (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This message was 
the very heart of the transaction, as Appellants had sought to purchase an income-
producing property. 
The message that the property was income-producing created in the 
Respondents a duty to disclose under the situations summarized in Watts. First, 
Respondents' nondisclosure made their "partial statements" in the Estoppel Certificate 
and Income and Expense Statement even more "misleading" because the message those 
documents conveyed--the tenant was paying rent and the property was income-
producing-was not true. Watts, 131 Idaho at 620 (situation (b)). 
Second, "subsequent information" in the November 2007 note made the 
message of the earlier Estoppel and Income and Expense Statement "misleading," as the 
tenant was, in fact, not paying its rent. Three months of nonpayment in October, 
November and December 2007, just prior to the purchase, should have led Respondents 
to disclose that the property was not income-producing as advertised. Id. (situation (c)). 
Third, Respondents knew that the message of the Estoppel and Income and 
Expense Statement was not entirely accurate when these documents were provided to the 
Appellants, due to the fact that the tenant had already replaced payment for several 
months of rent for 2006 and 2007 with the April 2007 Note, which was forgiven 
simultaneously with the tenant signing the Estoppel. The failure to provide Appellants 
any context to the rent representations in both documents meant that the Appellants were 
left to rely on an inaccurate representation in buying the property. Id. (situation (d)). 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING - 9 
"A duty to speak arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal 
terms or where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other 
party." Id. Appellants did not deal on equal terms with the Respondents with regard to 
Respondents' private dealings with the tenant, and did not have in their possession either 
of the two promissory notes. Furthermore, Respondents knew that Appellants did not 
have these documents or any explanation for their existence. 
This Court has previously held that "silence, in circumstances where a 
prospective purchaser might be led to harmful conclusions, is a fonn of 
'representation[.]'" Watts, 131 Idaho at 621 (quoting Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 
571 P.2d 769 (1977)); see also O'Sh~1!, slip op at 22 (1. Jones, J., dissenting opinion) 
("[fJraud is fraud, and this Court has not previously drawn a clear distinction between 
fraud involving nondisclosure of a material fact and fraud involving an affirmative 
misrepresentation."). Appellants addressed affirmative fraud and nondisclosure together 
in sections of their Brief (pp. 18-24), but this should not have been prejudicial to their 
nondisclosure argument. These nondisclosures by the Respondents were material, and it 
was enor for the trial court not to consider them properly on post-trial motions. This 
Court should have considered those arguments. 
b. Facts Supporting the Argument on the Jury Instruction on 
Fraud by Nondisclosure. 
In Section CA of the Am2el1ants' Brief (pages 33 through 35), Appellants 
identified the situations in which a duty to disclose existed, and also the facts which the 
Respondents failed to disclose. Specifically, Appellants stated the law from Watts and 
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Sowards, specified the items the Respondents had a duty to disclose under Watts and 
Sowards (including the "existence of promissory notes which materially altered the rent 
payment responsibilities of the Center[;]" the "April 18,2007 promissory note[;]" the 
"November 7, 2007 promissory note[;]" and that "all minimum monthly rent had not 
been paid"), and argued why these duties existed. See O'Shea, p. 34. 
As previously stated, Appellants were not required by Rule 35(a)(6) to 
restate these facts and argument in successive sections of their brief where they also 
applied. To do so would have been wasteful and excessive, particularly considering the 
page limitations on an appellate brief. To require such repetition would be to elevate 
procedure over substance to an unnecessary and unjust degree. 
Appellants respectfully request that this Court rehear argument as to fraud 
by nondisclosure, matters it previously refused to consider. 
3. The Appellants were not irrevocably bound to purchase the property 
simply by sign_ing the Purchase and Sale Agreement; rather they retained all of theit: 
contractual, legal and equitable rights upon a breach of the Agreement by High Mark 
Development. 
Regarding Appellants' fraud claims, this Court held that false 
representations about the financial condition of the tenant made after the Trust had 
entered into the contract could not form the basis of a fraud claim because (a) "the 
contract did not provide that the Trust could terminate it if the Trust determined that the 
tenant was not financially sound" and (b) the "Trust was already bound to purchase the 
property before the alleged false representations were made." O'Shea, p. 4, 17. 
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The Trust was not irrevocably "bound" to purchase the property after 
signing the Purchase and Sale Agreement. The jury was instructed that the Estoppel 
Certificate was not accurate. In other words, the remedy that, "[ s ]hould the information 
provided on the estoppel differ from the information provided by Seller, Buyer shall have 
the option to terminate" would become operative at any time after the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement was signed, had the Respondents disclosed accurate information regarding 
rent payments. To hold otherwise would have made this remedy meaningless. The 
combination of this particular remedy, and the instruction that the Estoppel Certificate 
contained inaccurate information, weighed heavily in favor of a duty on the part of 
Respondents to disclose the truth. 
Most importantly, Paragraph 24 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
provided as follows: 
If SELLER defaults, having approved said sale and fails to 
consummate the same as herein agreed, BUYER'S Earnest 
Money deposit shall be returned to him/her and SELLER 
shall pay for the costs of title insurance, escrow fees, credit 
report fees, inspection fees, Brokerage fees and all attorney's 
fees, if any. This shall not be considered as a waiver by 
BUYER of any other lawful right or remedy to which 
BUYER may be entitled, 
See Exh. 5, p. 5 (emphasis added). To "consummate" commonly means "to bring to 
completion[.]" AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, p. 286 (1969). High Mark certainly 
could not comply with its obligations under the Agreement by providing false 
information. R., p. 1168. Appellants therefore had the right, upon learning of the 
misrepresentation, to "either rescind the contract and recover any payments made by him 
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or her, or treat the contract as subsisting and sue the vendor in fraud and deceit for the 
damages sustained." 77 AM. JUR. 20 Vendor and Purchaser § 531 (2006). Appellants 
sought rescission or monetary damages in their Complaint, within their contractual, legal 
and equitable rights. 
Nowhere in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, or in the language quoted by 
the Court, does it state that the Trust could not seek remedies in law or equity if it 
subsequently learned of fraud or misrepresentations. This Court incorrectly limited 
Appellants' rights under the Purchase and Sale Agreement, and should rehear argument 
on this issue. 
4. The evidence showed that, hCLd they known the truth about the 
tenant's rent history, Appellants would not have purchased the property. 
This Court held that "[t]he jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiffs 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they would not have purchased the 
property had they known of the nonpayment of rent[.]" 0' Shea, pp. 8-12. The Court 
based its decision upon a finding that the Appellants did not inquire into losses the tenant 
had experienced in the past or conduct an independent investigation, and were set on 
completing a Section 1031 exchange within the time limitations required by law. 
That decision is contrary to the Court's own precedent. Appellants were 
entitled to rely upon the representations of the seller. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 
507, 112 P.3d 788 (2005); see also Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 
(2007). This was stated very clearly in the Estoppel Certificate: 
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This certification is made with the knowledge that it 
will be relied upon by the Purchaser, Purchaser's lender and 
any successor or assignee of Purchaser's right to purchase the 
Property in connection with financing and sales of the 
Property and the purchase of the Property by the Purchaser. 
Exh.25. Appellants did not know that the Estoppel Certificate or Income and Expense 
Statement-both requested by the Appellants as part of the sale--contained inaccurate 
statements regarding rent payments. Nevertheless, they had no duty to independently 
investigate the truth. Watts v. Krebs, l31 Idaho 616, 621, 962 P.2d 387 (1998). Ifa 
purchaser relies upon misleading facts and does not conduct his own independent 
investigation, "he is entitled to relief from the seller's misrepresentation, whether made 
fraudulently or not." Snow's Auto Supply, Inc. v. Dormaier, 108 Idaho 73, 78, 696 P.2d 
924 (Ct. App. 1985). Appellants' reliance upon High Mark's statements and failure to 
conduct additional investigation is not evidence that they would have purchased the 
property even if they had known the truth. 
The relevance of the nonpayment of rent was twofold. First, as the tenant's 
biggest expense to the landlord, the jury could have only reasonably concluded that 
disclosure of nonpayment of rent for several months prior to the purchase would have 
been of critical importance to the Appellants, who were seeking an income-producing 
property. Second, given the statements in the Estoppel Certificate concerning rent, upon 
which all parties involved understood Appellants were relying, disclosure of significant 
nonpayments would have indicated that Respondents had not been truthful. Appellants 
purchased the property without a true understanding of the rent history. It is 
unreasonable to conclude that they would have acted the same with a true understanding 
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of the rent history. The Appellants unequivocally testified at trial that they would not 
have purchased the property had they known the truth. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-13. 
No evidence to the contrary was presented. 
Finally, this Court incolTectly held that the jury could have found that 
misrepresentations were not the cause of the Appellants' damages because the tenant's 
ultimate failure was due to factors out of Respondents' control. O'Shea, p. 13. Even if 
the reasons stated by the Court were indeed the cause of the tenant's ultimate demise, this 
had no effect on the right of the Appellants to rely upon the misrepresentations 
concerning the payment of rent. 
Appellants may well have been satisfied with the financial information 
given to them by Respondents. O'Shea, p. 12. Little did they know that it was 
inaccurate. Had they the truth regarding the non-payment of rent, the facts and their 
testimony at trial showed that Appellants would not have purchased the property. This 
Comt should rehear matters conceming causation. 
5. This Court shoutd have, at !he very least..remanded this matter to the 
trial court to properly separate its analysis of JNOV and new trial. 
"[I]t is essential that if an alternative motion for a new trial is made with the 
motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial court must rule on both motions separately." Quick 
v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). "On a motion for a new trial, the 
court has broad discretion. On a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., it has no 
discretion and must consider only the question of law whether there is sufficient evidence 
to raise a jury issue. On a motion for a new trial the court weighs the evidence and the 
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credibility of the witnesses. On a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment n.o.v., it 
does not." Id. at 766. 
These very different standards of review required the trial court to 
separately analyze the JNOV and new trial motions. The trial court did not do so. The 
same standards were announced at the outset of each claim, the evidence was presented 
only once, and then the C0U11 made two rulings on two different motions in one sentence 
following the discussion of the evidence. The trial court impermissibly, improperly and 
unfairly combined its analyses of the Appellants' motions. 
On the new trial motion, the trial court failed to properly weigh all the 
evidence, instead focusing exclusively on evidence presented by the Respondents. The 
trial court did not mention any evidence presented by the Appellants at trial in its 
analysis. On appeal, this Court's analysis likewise did not show that the trial court 
considered any of the Appellants' evidence in deciding the new trial motion. O'Shea, p. 
18. 
This Court should rehear whether the trial court erred in its analysis of the 
post-trial motions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants' Petition for Rehearing should be 
granted. 
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DATED this 
~-"""'-
of May, 2012. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
By __ ---"'-__ . 
C. Timothy Hopkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Petitioners 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING - 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. 
Kirton McConkie, PC 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 11 
-- of May, 2012. 
IIIl U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
0 Facsimile 
0 Email 
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